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MotionA recent study has shown that a range of different motion illusions occurring
during smooth pursuit eye-movements can be explained as optimal percepts
based on a simple model derived from the Bayesian statistical framework.Marc O. Ernst
Illusions occur in all domains of the
perceptual system. These include
pictorial illusions, illumination illusions,
or motion illusions. Intuitively, such
illusions are considered a failure of the
perceptual system. A closer look,
however, often reveals the opposite:
using the Bayesian statistical
framework it has been demonstrated
several times that such illusions can
actually be viewed as instances of
optimal perceptual performance [1–4].
To appreciate this, we have to
understand that human perception can
be well described as a probabilistic
process. This is because noisy and
often ambiguous sensory information
builds the basis for the inference of the
percept. To constrain the range of
possible interpretations of the noisy
sensory information, the brain may use
prior knowledge about the statistical
regularities of the environment. The
Bayesian statistical framework
provides a principled method for
optimally combining prior knowledge
with noisy sensory evidence as
encoded in the likelihood function.
The result of this combination is the
most reliable and accurate estimate
of the underlying environmental
property. Maximizing reliability and
accuracy seems a desirable goal
for many perceptual-motor tasks.
Illusions explained by this framework
may therefore be considered
manifestations of optimal perceptual
performance.
In 2002, Weiss et al. [1] used this
Bayesian framework to explain a class
of motion illusions that occur during
fixation when the eyes are still. One
example of such a motion illusion is
that low contrast stimuli are perceived
to be moving more slowly than high
contrast stimuli, even when the
velocities are actually the same. Weiss
et al. [1] suggested that these illusions
could be explained by a prior for slow
motion centered at zero velocity: such
a prior is a reasonable assumption
because, in statistical terms, objectstend to be stationary or to move only
slowly. When such a slow-motion prior
is combined with sensory evidence, the
prior information receives increasingly
more weight the less reliable the
sensory evidence becomes. Low
contrast stimuli provide less reliable
motion signals compared to high
contrast stimuli, so in combination with
the slow-motion prior, low contrast
stimuli are perceived to have a lower
velocity. As Weiss et al. [1] showed,
such a prior quantitatively predicts
these kind of motion illusions. Using
empirical methods Stocker and
Simoncelli [5] have inferred the shape
of this prior, thereby confirming the
slow-motion assumptions made by
Weiss et al. [1].
In a paper in this issue of Current
Biology, Freeman et al. [6] extend this
framework to active perception and
a class of motion illusions occurring
during smooth pursuit eye movements.
Among those illusions are the Filehne
Illusion [7], in which a stationary
background object appears to move,
and the Aubert-Fleischl Phenomenon
[8,9], where pursuit stimuli appear to be
slower. Compared to the eye static
illusions considered by Weiss et al. [1],
the situation here is complicated by
the existence of eye movements.
Thus, in addition to the retinal motion
information, there is a non-zero eye
movement signal. The question
therefore arises how these signals are
combined with the prior for slow
motion. To account for the illusions,
Freeman et al. [6] convincingly
demonstrate that the slow-motion prior
is first integrated with an estimate of
pursuit target motion and an estimate
of relative motion, before those are
summed into the final motion percept
(Figure 1). The illusions arise because
both estimates can be differently
reliable, so that the prior has
a differential influence on these
estimates before they are summed. The
alternative, that the estimates are first
summed and integrated with the prior
only later, cannot account for the
illusions, because such a model wouldnot allow the estimates to be weighted
differentially.
The paper by Freeman et al. [6]
makes several significant
contributions. Foremost, it provides
a common Bayesian framework to
understand a whole class of motion
illusions occurring during smooth
pursuit eye movements. Previously,
different, seemingly ad hoc accounts,
which most often assumed biased
perceptual estimates, were necessary
to explain these illusions. The common
framework presented by Freeman et al.
[6] should thus help to significantly
simplify the literature. More
importantly, however, this framework
should enable us to predict further
perceptual phenomena of active
motion perception. For example, it
will be interesting to see whether
this account can explain motion
illusions in other domains of active
perception as well, such as illusions
during head movements or
locomotion. For example, it is known
that retinal motion is perceived to
be slower during walking as
compared to standing still, a
phenomenon that Durgin et al. [10]
called ‘subtraction’. Also in the haptic
(touch) domain, kinesthetic and tactile
motion signals have to be combined
into a coherent motion percept
representing movement in the world.
It would be interesting to see
whether similar motion illusions
as found in vision also occur in the
haptic modality.
In motion perception and many
other domains, Weber’s law, which
states that the discrimination
performance is proportional to the
magnitude of the signal, fails at low
signal values. Instead of evoking an
early non-linearity to model this
behavior, which is done by most
traditional models (for example
[5,11,12]), Freeman et al. [6] show that,
in the Bayesian framework, Weber’s
law and its breakdown can be
explained by a prior acting on sensory
signals with variable internal noise. This
is a key idea that might help to bring the
different modeling approaches
currently existing into line. It further
demonstrates the diversity of the
Bayesian approach in providing
a general framework for understanding
phenomena in human perception.
To confirm this modeling approach,
however, it remains to be seen how
consistently the variable noise can be
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Figure 1. The motion illusion analysed by Freeman et al. [6].
(A) Perceptual situation. Pursuit target object moving in front of the background. (B) Integra-
tion model. Upper panel: combination of pursuit target motion signals (T) with slow-motion
prior (P) according to Bayes rule. This results in the posterior distribution with the maximum
a posteriori estimate T0. Middle panel: combination of relative motion signals (R) with slow-
motion prior (P) resulting in maximum a posteriori estimate R0. Lower panel: sum of T0 and
R0, which results in the Filehne illusion, with the background apparently in motion.
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R358characterized and whether this
approach can be used also in other
domains where different priors might
exist.
From a modeling point of view
Freeman et al. [6] provide interesting
insights into the level at which prior
information interacts with sensory
evidence. They mainly distinguish two
implementations of Bayesian models:
in the first, the sensory estimates aresummed and then combined with the
prior information; in the second, each
sensory estimate is first combined with
the prior and then summed. Evidence
for the latter comes predominantly
from accounts for the Filehne illusion.
The handling of the level at which the
priors operate and what the
consequences are for perception are
not only of theoretical interest, but
may also hint at the way the Bayesiancomputations are implemented
neuronally in the brain. Up to now,
however, our knowledge about how
such computations are represented
in the human brain is very limited.
There are some first indications from
computational neuroscience that
probability distributions used for the
Bayesian computations — priors,
likelihoods — may be implemented in
neuronal population codes [13,14].
There is also some recent evidence
from monkey physiology that
Bayes-optimal integration of visual
and vestibular estimates of perceived
direction of motion may be conducted
in populations of neurons in area MSTd
of the monkey brain [15].
One major problem that we face
currently with the Bayesian approach is
that the prior distributions, which are
used to represent the statistics of the
sensory signals derived from the
environment, are merely postulated.
The reason for this is that they are not
easily measurable. Future research
needs to address how priors can be
determined, measured, or manipulated
independently. There are several
ways to achieve this. One method
entails the study of how priors are
learned in one context and then to
investigate how the learning of
these priors is transferred to other
situations or tasks. This has
successfully been demonstrated by
Adams et al. [16], who adapted the
light-from-above prior in one context
and demonstrated transfer of the
learning effect to another context
and task, thereby undoubtedly
demonstrating the updating of
a priori knowledge [16]. Alternatively,
one can indirectly infer the prior by
varying the reliability of the signal
estimates using a method proposed
by Stocker and Simoncelli [5]. Ideally,
such an inferred prior distribution
should then be compared to the
statistics of the environment as
measured independently by some
physical measurement method.
Recently, this approach has been
employed by Burge et al. [17] for the
visual perception of depth at an
occluding contour. In their
experiments, Burge et al. [17] found
a good qualitative agreement between
the empirically inferred prior and
the physically measured statistics
of the environment. Future research
must strive to demonstrate such
correspondence between postulated
priors and the statistics of the
Dispatch
R359environment in order to justify the
Bayesian approach to human
perception.
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Spindle LengthRecent studies have investigated the mechanisms responsible for setting
spindle length — and how spindle length changes over the course of
development.Daniel J. Needleman*
and Reza Farhadifar
You started life as a single fertilized egg
and, after multiple divisions, the
number of cells in your body is now one
hundred times larger than the number
of stars in the galaxy. The DNA in your
cells originated from that first cell,
propagated through rounds of
duplication and segregation. This
division of your genetic material
continues to occur inside you about
ten million times per second. An
error could give rise to a cancer that
will kill you. How can one cellular
structure, the mitotic spindle, so
accurately partition DNA in your
various cells and tissues? A partial
answer is that the premise of the
question is wrong: it’s not that one
spindle functions repeatedly, rather
the spindles in your different cells are
different. Despite the biological and
medical importance of the regulation
of spindle form and function during
development, we know very little
about this phenomenon, and even
less about the underlying processes
responsible for it. In a recent issue of
Current Biology, Greenan et al. [1]present a study of the mechanistic
basis of the variation in spindle length
observed during Caenorhabditis
elegans embryogenesis. Work such as
this should help to reveal how DNA can
be correctly segregated in cells with
different dimensions, morphologies,
and environments.
All mitotic spindles are bipolar
structures composed of cytoskeletal
polymers called microtubules [2].
Microtubules in spindles are highly
dynamic; they typically turnover with
a lifetime of tens of seconds. The
continual balance of polymerization,
depolymerization, and new nucleation
allows spindles to last orders of
magnitude longer than the
microtubules that they are made of.
Microtubules that contact
chromosomes on special regions,
called kinetochores, become
preferentially stabilized. These
kinetochore microtubules are
responsible for exerting the forces
on chromosomes that result in their
division. In addition to segregating
chromosomes, the spindle partitions
other cellular components, such as
centrioles, which form the base of cilia
during interphase. In mitosis, centriolesare incorporated into centrosomes,
microtubule nucleating centers located
at the spindle poles. While components
of spindles have been studied in detail,
we still do not know how these
constituents work together to form
spindles.
Many models of spindle organization
have been devised. These can roughly
be divided into two classes:
mechanical models and dynamical
models. Mechanical models propose
that spindle morphology and size result
solely from a balance of forces, with
pushing by some factors, such as
motor proteins and polymerizing
microtubules [3], counteracted by
resistance from other elements, such
as opposing motors, microtubule
rigidity [4], or chromosome stiffness [5].
These mechanical models are
reminiscent of elasticity theory of
simple physical structures like soap
bubbles, whose shape is governed
by a balance of surface tension and
internal pressure. Dynamical models
posit that spindle structure arises
from the self-organization of
the spontaneous activity of the
constituent microtubules, motor
proteins, and regulatory factors.
Examples of dynamical models
include the suggestion that spindle
length is set by proteins that induce
a length-dependent microtubule
depolymerization [6], or the distance
a microtubule slides during its
lifetime [7].
An influential class of dynamical
models is that spindle structure is
